Nuance Abounds • Page 2 • Because details matter

§ 4.3: Solution concepts in extensive-form games

Game Theory

§ 4.3: Solution concepts in extensive-form games

§ 5.1 Introduction to repeated games

Game Theory

§ 5.1 Introduction to repeated games

§ 5.2 Infinitely repeated games with discounting

Game Theory

§ 5.2 Infinitely repeated games with discounting

§ 5.3 A Folk Theorem sampler

Game Theory

§ 5.3 A Folk Theorem sampler

§ 6.1 Static games of incomplete information

Game Theory

§ 6.1 Static games of incomplete information

§ 6.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of sender-receiver (signaling) games

Game Theory

§ 6.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of sender-receiver (signaling) games

§ 6.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of extensive-form games

Game Theory

§ 6.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of extensive-form games